ITM is an open framework - Submit your contributions now.

Insider Threat Matrix™

  • ID: DT014
  • Created: 30th May 2024
  • Updated: 14th June 2024
  • Platforms: Windows, Linux, MacOS,
  • Contributor: The ITM Team

Utilize Cold Storage for Logs

By autonomously collecting log files from a system and transporting them to another system, such as a SIEM collector, they are typically no longer accessible by the subject, preventing them from being able to delete them. These can aid in investigations where a subject has deleted local logs.

Sections

ID Name Description
AF002Log Deletion

The subject deliberately deletes logs to eliminate records of their activity and hinder subsequent investigation. This may include host-based logs (e.g., Windows Event Logs, Linux audit logs), application logs (e.g., authentication or access records), or network-level logs (e.g., firewall or proxy logs).

 

Deletion may be selective by targeting specific time ranges, event types, or identifiers, or more broad by wiping entire log files or directories to prevent attribution or timeline reconstruction.

AF026Log Modification

The subject intentionally alters or removes log entries, either at the host, application, or network level, in a deliberate attempt to conceal or misrepresent their actions. This behavior is typically executed to frustrate forensic reconstruction during an investigation and may include deletion of individual log lines, rewriting timestamps, or manipulating source IPs or usernames.

 

Subjects engaging in this technique may use native administrative tools (e.g., PowerShell, auditpol, journalctl), third-party log scrubbers, or direct file system access to tamper with .evtx, .log, or flat text logs.

AF002.001Clear Windows Event Logs

A subject clears Windows Event logs to conceal evidence of their activities.

Windows Event Logs store various types of information, such as system errors, application events, security auditing messages, and other operational events.

The logs are stored in C:/WINDOWS/system32/config.

Windows Event Logs can be cleared using the Event Viewer utility, provided the user account has administrative privileges.

AF002.002Clear Linux System Logs

A subject deletes Linux system logs to obscure or eliminate evidence of an infringement. Linux log files, such as authentication attempts, sudo usage, system errors, and audit trails, serve as critical forensic artifacts during post-incident analysis. These logs are commonly stored in /var/log, and include files such as auth.log, syslog, messages, and secure.

 

Deletion may occur manually via the rm command, through scripted automation, or by modifying log rotation settings to erase historical activity.

AF002.003Clear macOS System Logs

A subject deletes macOS system logs to obscure or eliminate evidence of an infringement. macOS stores a range of log data, including authentication attempts, application launches, process crashes, system events, and security audits, within /private/var/log and through the unified logging system accessible via the log command. Key files may include system.log, install.log, asl.log, and diagnostic logs within DiagnosticMessages and CrashReporter.

 

Deletion may occur manually via the rm or log erase commands, through scripted automation, or by modifying log rotation settings to erase historical activity.