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Insider Threat Matrix™Insider Threat Matrix™
  • ID: DT126
  • Created: 21st May 2025
  • Updated: 23rd October 2025
  • Platform: Windows
  • MITRE ATT&CK®: DS0024
  • Contributor: The ITM Team

Registry Value Audit, Start_TrackProgs

Monitor and audit the Start_TrackProgs registry value located at:
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Advanced

 

This value controls whether Windows logs application launch activity to the UserAssist and RunMRU keys. When set to 1 (default), app tracking is enabled. When set to 0, application launch tracking is disabled, significantly reducing the availability of user activity artifacts for forensic reconstruction.
 

A subject modifying this setting may be attempting to operate without leaving standard execution traces, making it a low-noise anti-forensics technique that can persist across sessions and reboots.

Sections

ID Name Description
AF007.003Disabling Application Launch Tracking via Registry

The subject modifies the Windows Registry to disable the operating system’s application launch tracking, thereby preventing the creation of key forensic artifacts used to reconstruct user activity. This technique suppresses the generation of records in RunMRU (Run Most Recently Used) and UserAssist, both of which are commonly referenced in forensic timelines to identify command execution and GUI application use.


By setting the registry value:

HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Advanced\Start_TrackProgs = 0

Windows stops logging user application launches, resulting in missing or incomplete histories. This technique is subtle and persistent, particularly effective on systems where registry auditing is not actively enforced.

 

Example Scenario:
A subject disables application tracking on a corporate workstation using a script that sets Start_TrackProgs = 0 under their HKCU hive. Over several days, they use various portable administrative tools (e.g., credential viewers, compression utilities) without creating entries in RunMRU or UserAssist. When an internal investigation is launched, investigators find an unexpected absence of user activity in these artifacts, delaying attribution and requiring deeper memory analysis to reconstruct events.