Install an Anti-Virus Solution

The subject deliberately or inadvertently introduces malicious software (commonly referred to as malware) into the organization’s environment. This may occur via manual execution, automated dropper delivery, browser‑based compromise, USB usage, or sideloading through legitimate processes. Malicious software includes trojans, keyloggers, ransomware, credential stealers, remote access tools (RATs), persistence frameworks, or other payloads designed to cause harm, exfiltrate data, degrade systems, or maintain unauthorized control.

Installation of malicious software represents a high-severity infringement, regardless of whether the subject's intent was deliberate or negligent. In some cases, malware introduction is the culmination of prior behavioral drift (e.g. installing unapproved tools or disabling security controls), while in others it may signal malicious preparation or active compromise.

This Section is distinct from general “Installing Unapproved Software”, which covers non‑malicious or policy-violating tools. Here, the software itself is malicious in purpose or impact, even if delivered under benign pretenses.

A subject misuses social media platforms to engage in activities that violate organizational policies, compromise security, disclose confidential information, or damage the organization’s reputation. This includes sharing sensitive data, making unauthorized statements, engaging in harassment or bullying, or undertaking any actions that could risk the organization’s digital security or public image.

A subject installs custom software or malware on an endpoint, potentially disguising it as a legitimate process. This software includes tripwire logic to monitor the system for signs of security activity.

The tripwire software monitors various aspects of the endpoint to detect potential investigations:

• Security Tool Detection: It scans running processes and monitors new files or services for signatures of known security tools, such as antivirus programs, forensic tools, and Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) systems.
• File and System Access: It tracks access to critical files or system directories (e.g., system logs, registry entries) commonly accessed during security investigations. Attempts to open or read sensitive files can trigger an alert.
• Network Traffic Analysis: The software analyzes network traffic to identify unusual patterns, including connections to Security Operations Centers (SOC) or the blocking of command-and-control servers by network security controls.
• User and System Behavior: It observes system behavior and monitors logs (such as event logs) that indicate an investigation is in progress, such as switching to an administrative account or modifying security settings (e.g., enabling disk encryption, changing firewall rules).

Upon detecting security activity, the tripwire can initiate various evasive responses:

• Alert the Subject: It covertly sends an alert to an external server controlled by the subject, using common system tools (e.g., curl, wget, or HTTP requests).
• Modify Endpoint Behavior: It can terminate malicious processes, erase evidence (e.g., logs, browser history, specific files), or restore system and network configurations to conceal signs of tampering.

A subject uses files with canary tokens as a tripwire mechanism to detect the presence of security personnel or investigation activities within a compromised environment. This method involves strategically placing files embedded with special identifiers (canary tokens) that trigger alerts when accessed. For example:

The subject creates files containing canary tokens—unique identifiers that generate an alert when they are accessed, opened, or modified. These files can appear as regular documents, logs, configurations, or other items that might attract the attention of an investigator during a security response.

The subject strategically places these files in various locations within the environment:

• Endpoints: Files with canary tokens are stored in directories where digital forensics or malware analysis is likely to occur, such as system logs, user data directories, or registry entries.
• Cloud Storage: The files are uploaded to cloud storage buckets, virtual machines, or application databases where security teams might search for indicators of compromise.
• Network Shares: Shared drives and network locations where forensic investigators or security tools may perform scans.

Once in place, the canary token within each file serves as a silent tripwire. The token monitors for access and automatically triggers an alert if an action is detected:

• Access Detection: If a security tool, administrator, or investigator attempts to open, modify, or copy the file, the embedded canary token sends an alert to an external server controlled by the subject.
• Network Traffic: The token can initiate an outbound network request (e.g., HTTP, DNS) to a specified location, notifying the subject of the exact time and environment where the access occurred.
• Behavior Analysis: The subject might include multiple canary files, each with unique tokens, to identify the pattern of investigation, such as the sequence of directories accessed or specific file types of interest to the security team.

Upon receiving an alert from a triggered canary token, the subject can take immediate steps to evade detection:

• Alert the Subject: The canary token sends a covert signal to the subject's designated server or communication channel, notifying them of the potential investigation.
• Halt Malicious Activity: The subject can use this warning to suspend ongoing malicious actions, such as data exfiltration or command-and-control communications, to avoid further detection.
• Clean Up Evidence: Scripts can be triggered to delete or alter logs, remove incriminating files, or revert system configurations to their original state, complicating any forensic investigation.
• Feign Normalcy: The subject can restore or disguise compromised systems to appear as though nothing suspicious has occurred, minimizing signs of tampering.

By using files with canary tokens as tripwires, a subject can gain early warning of investigative actions and respond quickly to avoid exposure. This tactic allows them to outmaneuver standard security investigations by leveraging silent alerts that inform them of potential security team activity.

The subject installs and operates unauthorized cryptocurrency mining software on organizational systems, leveraging compute, network, and energy resources for personal financial gain. This activity subverts authorized system use policies, degrades operational performance, increases attack surface, and introduces external control risks.

Characteristics

• Deploys CPU-intensive or GPU-intensive processes (e.g., xmrig, ethminer, phoenixminer, nicehash) on endpoints, servers, or cloud infrastructure without approval.
• May use containerized deployments (Docker), low-footprint mining scripts, browser-based JavaScript miners, or stealth binaries disguised as legitimate processes.
• Often configured to throttle resource usage during business hours to evade human and telemetry detection.
• Establishes persistent outbound network connections to mining pools (e.g., via Stratum mining protocol over TCP/SSL).
• Frequently disables system security features (e.g., Anti-Virus (AV)/Endpoint Detection & Response (EDR) agents, power-saving modes) to maintain uninterrupted mining sessions.
• Represents not only misuse of resources but also creates unauthorized outbound communication channels that bypass standard network controls.

Example Scenario

A subject installs a customized xmrig Monero mining binary onto under-monitored R&D servers by side-loading it via a USB device. The miner operates in "stealth mode," hiding its process name within legitimate system services and throttling CPU usage to 60% during business hours. Off-peak hours show 95% CPU utilization with persistent outbound TCP traffic to an external mining pool over a non-standard port. The mining operation remains active for six months, leading to significant compute degradation, unplanned electricity costs, and unmonitored external network connections that could facilitate broader compromise.

The subject installs a browser capable of accessing anonymity networks, such as the Tor Browser (used for .onion sites), I2P Router Console, or Freenet, as part of preparation for covert research, anonymous communication, or unmonitored data exchange. This behavior may support future infringement by enabling non-attributable activity outside sanctioned IT controls.

Installation of the Tor Browser Bundle typically involves downloading a signed executable or compressed package from https://www.torproject.org, executing an installer that unpacks a portable browser (a custom-hardened Firefox variant), and launching start-tor-browser.exe—which spawns both the Tor daemon (tor.exe) and the browser instance (firefox.exe) in a sandboxed environment. Configuration files such as torrc may be modified to enable pluggable transports (e.g., obfs4, meek) designed to evade deep packet inspection (DPI) or proxy enforcement.

In environments with proxy filtering, the subject may attempt to chain Tor through bridge relays or VPNs, obfuscate traffic using SOCKS5 tunneling, or execute from non-standard directories (e.g., cloud-sync folders, external volumes). Some subjects bypass endpoint controls entirely by booting into live-operating systems (e.g., Tails, Whonix) which route all system traffic through Tor by default and leave minimal forensic artifacts on host storage.

This installation is rarely accidental and often coincides with other policy evasions or drift indicators. The presence of anonymizing tools—even in dormant form—warrants scrutiny as a preparatory indicator linked to potential data exfiltration, credential harvesting, or external coordination.

The subject deploys credential-harvesting malware (commonly referred to as an infostealer) to extract sensitive authentication material or session artifacts from systems under their control. These payloads are typically configured to capture data from browser credential stores (e.g., Login Data SQLite databases in Chromium-based browsers), password vaults (e.g., KeePass, 1Password), clipboard buffers, Windows Credential Manager, or the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) memory space.

Infostealers may be executed directly via compiled binaries, staged through malicious document macros, or loaded reflectively into memory using PowerShell, .NET assemblies, or process hollowing techniques. Some variants are fileless and reside entirely in memory, while others create persistence via registry keys (e.g., HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run) or scheduled tasks.

While often associated with external threat actors, insider deployment of infostealers allows subjects to bypass authentication safeguards, impersonate peers, or exfiltrate internal tokens for later use or sale. In cases where data is not immediately exfiltrated, local staging (e.g., in %AppData%, %Temp%, or encrypted containers) may indicate an intent to transfer data offline or deliver it via alternate channels.

The subject deploys ransomware within the organization’s environment, resulting in the encryption, locking, or destructive alteration of organizational data, systems, or backups. Ransomware used by insiders may be obtained from public repositories, affiliate programs (e.g. RaaS platforms), or compiled independently using commodity builder kits. Unlike external actors who rely on phishing or remote exploitation, insiders often bypass perimeter controls by detonating ransomware from within trusted systems using local access.

Ransomware payloads are typically compiled as executables, occasionally obfuscated using packers or crypters to evade detection. Execution may be initiated via command-line, scheduled task, script wrapper, or automated loader. Encryption routines often target common file extensions recursively across accessible volumes, mapped drives, and cloud sync folders. In advanced deployments, the subject may disable volume shadow copies (vssadmin delete shadows) or stop backup agents (net stop) prior to detonation to increase impact.

In some insider scenarios, ransomware is executed selectively: targeting specific departments, shares, or systems, rather than broad detonation. This behavior may indicate intent to send a message, sabotage selectively, or avoid attribution. Payment demands may be issued internally, externally, or omitted entirely if disruption is the primary motive.

The subject deploys software designed to record keystrokes entered on an endpoint to capture credentials, sensitive communications, internal documentation, or intellectual property. Keyloggers may be introduced as standalone binaries, embedded within otherwise legitimate tools, or configured through dual-use frameworks (e.g. C++ dropper with keylogging module). In insider scenarios, the deployment is typically local and deliberate, leveraging the subject’s physical access or assigned privileges to bypass existing controls.

Keyloggers operate in one of several modes:

• Kernel-based: Install drivers or hook low-level keyboard input APIs (e.g. Kbdclass.sys) to intercept inputs pre-OS.
• User-mode: Hook Windows APIs (SetWindowsHookEx, GetAsyncKeyState, GetForegroundWindow) to log input tied to active processes or windows.
• Form grabbers: Intercept browser or GUI form submissions, often bypassing SSL/TLS encryption by logging data pre-submission.
• Clipboard and screen scrapers: Supplement keylogging with capture of copied content and screenshots for contextual awareness.

Captured data is typically stored in encrypted local files (e.g. %TEMP%, %APPDATA%, or hidden directories), periodically exfiltrated via email, FTP, HTTP POST, or external storage.

The subject deploys a Remote Access Tool (RAT): a software implant that provides covert, persistent remote control of an endpoint or server—enabling continued unauthorized access, monitoring, or post-employment re-entry. Unlike sanctioned remote administration platforms, RATs are deployed without organizational oversight and are often configured to obfuscate their presence, evade detection, or blend into legitimate activity.

RATs deployed by insiders may be off-the-shelf tools (e.g. njRAT, Quasar, Remcos), lightly modified open-source frameworks (e.g. Havoc, Pupy), or commercial-grade products repurposed for unsanctioned use (e.g. AnyDesk, TeamViewer in stealth mode). 

Functionality typically includes:

• Full GUI or shell access
• File system interaction
• Screenshot and webcam capture
• Credential harvesting
• Process and registry manipulation
• Optional keylogging and persistence modules

Deployment methods include manual installation, script-wrapped droppers, DLL side-loading, or execution via LOLBins (mshta, rundll32). Persistence is typically achieved through scheduled tasks, registry run keys, or disguised service installations. In some cases, the RAT may be configured to activate only during specific windows or respond to remote beacons, reducing exposure to detection.

The subject deploys destructive malware; software designed to irreversibly damage systems, erase data, or disrupt operational availability. Unlike ransomware, which encrypts files to extort payment, destructive malware is deployed with the explicit intent to delete, corrupt, or disable systems and assets without recovery. Its objective is disruption or sabotage, not necessarily for direct financial gain.

This behavior may include:

• Wiper malware (e.g. HermeticWiper, WhisperGate, ZeroCleare)
• Logic bombs or time-triggered deletion scripts
• Bootloader overwrite tools or UEFI tampering utilities
• Mass delete or format scripts (format, cipher /w, del /s /q, rm -rf)
• Data corruption utilities (e.g. file rewriters, header corruptors)
• Credential/system-wide lockout scripts (e.g. disabling accounts, resetting passwords en masse)

Insiders may deploy destructive malware as an act of retaliation (e.g. prior to departure), sabotage (e.g. to disrupt an investigation or competitor), or under coercion. Detonation may be manual or scheduled, and in some cases the malware is disguised as routine tooling to delay detection.

Destructive deployment is high-severity and often coincides with forensic tampering or precursor access based infringements (e.g. file enumeration or backup deletion).