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Insider Threat Matrix™

  • ID: PV059
  • Created: 21st May 2025
  • Updated: 21st May 2025
  • Contributor: Ryan Bellows

Insider-Focused Threat Intelligence

Threat intelligence feeds that include indicators of insider tactics—rather than just malware or phishing IoCs—can inform policy decisions, access design, and targeted monitoring. These feeds allow organizations to anticipate adversarial interest in recruiting, coercing, or planting insiders, and to mitigate the tools and behaviors those insiders are likely to use.

 

Prevention Measures:

Subscribe to threat intelligence services that provide curated insider threat profiles, including:

  • Recruitment patterns used by foreign intelligence services.
  • Behavioral precursors to sabotage, data theft, or access misuse.
  • Indicators from anonymized insider case disclosures (e.g., DFIR reports, industry reporting, national CERTs).

 

Use these feeds to inform:

  • DLP tuning based on exfiltration paths observed in real incidents.
  • Risk-based access policies that factor in job function, department, or geographic anomaly exposure.
  • Targeted internal education on known techniques (e.g., false flag account creation, side-channel messaging, Git repo exfiltration).

 

Examples of Insider-Focused TI Sources:

Sections

ID Name Description
MT017Espionage

A subject carries out covert actions, such as the collection of confidential or classified information, for the strategic advantage of a nation-state.

ME028Delegated Access via Managed Service Providers

An organization entrusts a Managed Service Provider (MSP) with administrative or operational access to its digital environment - typically for IT support, system maintenance, or development functions. This access is often persistent, privileged, and spans sensitive infrastructure or data environments.

 

The means is established when MSP personnel, including potential subjects, are permitted to authenticate into the client’s environment from systems or networks entirely outside the client's visibility or jurisdiction. These MSP endpoints may be unmanaged, unmonitored, or physically located in regions where customer organization's policies, incident response authority, or legal recourse do not apply.

 

This creates an unobservable access channel: the subject operates from infrastructure beyond the reach of the customer organization's logging, endpoint detection, or identity correlation. The organization is therefore unable to monitor or verify who accessed what, when, or from where—rendering all downstream actions unauditable by the customer organization's internal security teams, unless mirrored within the client-controlled environment.

 

The exposure can be compounded by the MSP’s internal controls (or lack thereof). Weak credential custody practices, shared administrative accounts, inadequate background checks, or poor workforce segmentation create conditions where privileged misuse or unauthorized access can occur without attribution or immediate detection. The subject does not require escalation—they begin with sanctioned access and operate under delegated trust, often without the constraints applied to internal staff.

 

This structural dependency - privileged access held externally, without enforceable oversight - creates the necessary conditions for an insider infringement to occur with low risk of interruption or accountability.

MT017.001Nation-State Alignment

The subject is a current or former asset of a nation-state intelligence service, operating inside the organization with pre-existing loyalty to, or direct affiliation with, a foreign government. Unlike insiders who develop espionage motives post-employment, this subject is often inserted, recruited prior to hiring, or cultivated externally over time and then encouraged to seek access to a target organization.

 

Their motive is the advancement of strategic objectives on behalf of a foreign nation-state. These objectives may include extracting sensitive information, degrading operational resilience, manipulating internal systems or decisions, weakening public or partner trust, or embedding long-term access for future exploitation. Such subjects may be formal intelligence officers, contract operatives, ideological affiliates, or individuals acting under recruitment, coercion, or influence.

 

Example Scenarios:

 

  • A subject recruited during university by a foreign security service secures a role in a telecommunications provider and enables covert surveillance access for state-level eavesdropping.
  • A subject hired into a biopharmaceutical firm has pre-existing links to a state-sponsored “talent program” and transfers research data to affiliated institutions abroad via covert cloud channels.
MT005.002Corporate Espionage

A third party private organization deploys an individual to a target organization to covertly steal confidential or classified information or gain strategic access for its own benefit.

MT005.001Speculative Corporate Espionage

A subject covertly collects confidential or classified information, or gains access, with the intent to sell it to a third party private organization.