Insider-Focused Threat Intelligence

A subject carries out covert actions, such as the collection of confidential or classified information, for the strategic advantage of a nation-state.

An organization entrusts a Managed Service Provider (MSP) with administrative or operational access to its digital environment - typically for IT support, system maintenance, or development functions. This access is often persistent, privileged, and spans sensitive infrastructure or data environments.

The means is established when MSP personnel, including potential subjects, are permitted to authenticate into the client’s environment from systems or networks entirely outside the client's visibility or jurisdiction. These MSP endpoints may be unmanaged, unmonitored, or physically located in regions where customer organization's policies, incident response authority, or legal recourse do not apply.

This creates an unobservable access channel: the subject operates from infrastructure beyond the reach of the customer organization's logging, endpoint detection, or identity correlation. The organization is therefore unable to monitor or verify who accessed what, when, or from where—rendering all downstream actions unauditable by the customer organization's internal security teams, unless mirrored within the client-controlled environment.

The exposure can be compounded by the MSP’s internal controls (or lack thereof). Weak credential custody practices, shared administrative accounts, inadequate background checks, or poor workforce segmentation create conditions where privileged misuse or unauthorized access can occur without attribution or immediate detection. The subject does not require escalation—they begin with sanctioned access and operate under delegated trust, often without the constraints applied to internal staff.

This structural dependency - privileged access held externally, without enforceable oversight - creates the necessary conditions for an insider infringement to occur with low risk of interruption or accountability.

The subject enumerates organizational CCTV coverage through physical reconnaissance, network-based probing, or a combination of both. This behavior aims to identify surveillance blind spots, coverage patterns, and system weaknesses in order to plan insider activity such as unauthorized entry, covert data removal, or sabotage.

• Physical enumeration involves walking routes to observe camera placement, photographing or sketching locations, and identifying fields of view, blind spots, or coverage overlaps. Subjects may test movement within blind zones or note environmental features (e.g., pillars, furniture) that obstruct visibility.

• Network enumeration targets digital surveillance systems, including IP cameras, DVRs, NVRs, and PoE switches. Subjects may scan for active devices, query configurations, or attempt login with default credentials to discover camera IPs, firmware details, and accessible streams.

When combined, physical and network enumeration provide a sophisticated map of surveillance infrastructure. For example, a subject may confirm camera placement through on-site observation, then validate viewing angles and live coverage zones by remotely accessing the corresponding camera feeds across the network. This dual approach allows the subject to identify exact surveillance gaps, test whether specific areas are monitored, and plan movement or concealment with high confidence.

This behavior is a strong indicator of deliberate preparation, as it requires technical effort, situational awareness, and intent to circumvent organizational surveillance.

The subject enters the organization with a pre-formed intent to exploit their position, gain access to sensitive data, or otherwise contravene internal policies. Unlike most new hires (who align with organizational values and security expectations) joiner-motivated subjects present a latent threat from day one, often embedding their intent within the onboarding process, role selection, or early-stage access decisions.

Joiner motivation may stem from pre-existing agendas including espionage, competitive intelligence, ideology, or personal financial gain. The subject may deliberately target roles that offer visibility into proprietary systems, customer data, intellectual property, or internal governance. Their background may be curated to pass pre-employment screening, and they may arrive with pre-established exfiltration methods or operational security tactics designed to avoid detection.

Risk is highest during the early tenure period, when access is granted but behavioral baselines are not yet established. These subjects often exploit onboarding leniency, trust-building phases, and provisioning delays, taking advantage of initial low scrutiny to stage preparatory actions or initiate incremental infringement.

Investigators should treat joiner cases with heightened sensitivity. Detection may implicate upstream controls such as hiring processes, third-party screening providers, or internal referral pathways. Missteps in attribution may also generate legal or reputational risk, particularly if the subject was placed in a position of elevated trust.

The subject is a current or former asset of a nation-state intelligence service, operating inside the organization with pre-existing loyalty to, or direct affiliation with, a foreign government. Unlike insiders who develop espionage motives post-employment, this subject is often inserted, recruited prior to hiring, or cultivated externally over time and then encouraged to seek access to a target organization.

Their motive is the advancement of strategic objectives on behalf of a foreign nation-state. These objectives may include extracting sensitive information, degrading operational resilience, manipulating internal systems or decisions, weakening public or partner trust, or embedding long-term access for future exploitation. Such subjects may be formal intelligence officers, contract operatives, ideological affiliates, or individuals acting under recruitment, coercion, or influence.

Example Scenarios:

• A subject recruited during university by a foreign security service secures a role in a telecommunications provider and enables covert surveillance access for state-level eavesdropping.
• A subject hired into a biopharmaceutical firm has pre-existing links to a state-sponsored “talent program” and transfers research data to affiliated institutions abroad via covert cloud channels.

A third party private organization deploys an individual to a target organization to covertly steal confidential or classified information or gain strategic access for its own benefit.

A subject covertly collects confidential or classified information, or gains access, with the intent to sell it to a third party private organization.

The subject is affected by an involuntary organizational decision to reduce headcount, commonly referred to as a workforce reduction, layoff, or redundancy. Unlike terminations for other reasons, workforce reduction typically affects multiple employees at once and is driven by budget constraints, restructuring, or strategic realignment.

A subject affected by workforce reduction may experience acute emotional responses (particularly resentment, betrayal, or perceived devaluation) which can develop into retaliatory or self-serving behaviors. These emotional states, when combined with continued access to internal systems, can motivate infringements.

Subjects impacted by workforce reductions may engage in infringements during the period between notification and final termination. When the workforce reduction is publicly known, subjects may further rationalize inappropriate actions as justified by circumstance or organizational failure. Investigators should consider the timing of the reduction announcement, the subject’s level of access, and any prior indicators of behavioral drift, before and during the offboarding window. Elevated risk is especially present where access revocation is delayed beyond a few hours after notification.

The subject initiates their voluntary departure from the organization, typically through formal resignation. While not inherently malicious, resignation marks a critical inflection point, particularly when paired with future employment at a competitor, ongoing interpersonal conflict, or dissatisfaction with organizational direction.

Subjects who resign may experience a shift in loyalty, a reduced sense of accountability, a weakened sense of confidentiality, or surface a previously held belief that organizational data is now personally justifiable to retain. These attitudes may lead to pre-exit infringement such as covert (or overt) data transfers to personal systems or accounts.

In many cases, resignation can introduce a false sense of finality or detachment, wherein the subject no longer adheres to internal policy boundaries. Risk is elevated during the notice period, especially in environments with weak offboarding processes.

The subject is involuntarily removed from the organization due to misconduct, performance failure, policy breach, or other cause-based grounds. Unlike workforce reductions (which typically involves a process and/or negotiation) terminations for cause are highly personal and often carry significant emotional charge, especially if the subject perceives the action as unjust, humiliating, or damaging to reputation or career prospects.

Subjects terminated for cause may exhibit high-risk behaviors during the pre-termination window (e.g., after being placed under investigation or on performance review) or immediately following notification. Even brief access persistence post-notification can present significant risk. The subject may attempt to delete evidence, exfiltrate data for leverage, disrupt systems, or stage retaliatory actions. The motivational blend of perceived injustice and loss of control often drives urgent, overt behavior with little regard for concealment.

Investigators should assess not only the subject’s final actions, but also the timeline of organizational awareness, specifically whether the subject had foreknowledge of the impending termination, and whether access controls were applied in parallel with disciplinary measures.

The subject departs the organization due to permanent withdrawal from the workforce (commonly through retirement, long-term medical leave, or other non-return scenarios). These exits are typically low-conflict and pre-announced, leading many organizations to deprioritize insider threat risk during the transition. However, this assumption can obscure several operational realities.

Retiring subjects (particularly long-tenured employees) often retain extensive institutional knowledge, broad access privileges, and deep familiarity with unmonitored systems or legacy processes. Emotional drivers such as nostalgia, ownership over work product, or a desire to “preserve” professional contributions may lead to data exfiltration, sometimes unconcealed or rationalized as harmless.

These behaviors are not necessarily malicious, but they still represent infringements, particularly when proprietary data, customer records, or sensitive infrastructure documentation is copied to personal devices or cloud accounts. Investigators should be attentive to the informal norms that often surround retirements, which may suppress scrutiny or allow boundary-stretching.

The subject departs the organization due to the planned or unplanned end of a temporary engagement  (typically as a contractor, consultant, vendor, or contingent worker). These non-renewals may lack the emotional intensity of involuntary terminations but introduce distinct insider threat risks tied to access posture, entitlement hygiene, and perceived ownership of deliverables.

Unlike full-time employees, contract-based personnel are frequently managed outside standard HR and identity governance systems. As a result, they often fall outside formal offboarding processes - retaining access to internal systems, repositories, or communication channels due to limited integration with core IT asset and access management workflows.

Separation timelines are commonly informal, unstructured, or delayed - particularly when procurement, business units, and security functions operate in silos. If the subject disagrees with the decision not to renew, or views their contributions as personally owned, data loss or intellectual property exfiltration may occur as a form of leverage or to support future portfolio use.

Investigators should recognize that contract-based relationships introduce a structurally distinct insider risk profile, particularly at time of exit. These subjects may exploit offboarding blind spots, reuse credentials, or transfer sensitive materials under the belief that they are exempt from internal policy enforcement. This hubris, combined with reduced visibility and limited organizational recourse, can enable undetected or unchallenged infringement.