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Insider Threat Matrix™

  • ID: PV062
  • Created: 24th July 2025
  • Updated: 24th July 2025
  • Contributor: The ITM Team

Static Code Analysis via CI/CD Pipelines

Static code analysis integrated into CI/CD pipelines provides a critical prevention mechanism against anti-forensic behaviors embedded in code, scripts, and infrastructure definitions. By enforcing automated review of logic patterns prior to deployment, organizations can detect concealed execution paths, scheduling abuse, and evasive constructs before they reach production.

 

This control is especially vital in mitigating deferred execution techniques, where the subject inserts code that activates long after submission—typically to evade scrutiny or delay attribution. Static analysis enables defenders to identify high-risk patterns at rest, before runtime, reducing reliance on reactive detection and shortening investigative timelines.

 

Detection of Time-Based Execution Logic:
Flag conditional statements that compare system time or date against hardcoded thresholds or calculated values.
Examples:

  • if (datetime.now() > target_date)
  • if time.time() > 1723468800 (UNIX timestamp obfuscation)

 

Abnormal Delay Functions and Sleep Calls:
Block or escalate the use of delay functions exceeding operational thresholds. Focus on calls intended to stall execution post-deployment.
Examples:

  • sleep(3600)
  • Start-Sleep -Seconds 1800
  • Thread.sleep(900000) (in Java)

 

Embedded Scheduler References in Scripts:
Detect scripting logic that attempts to create or modify scheduled tasks, cron jobs, or background triggers.
Examples:

  • echo '0 4 * * * /usr/bin/script.sh' >> /etc/crontab
  • schtasks /create /tn "Update" /tr C:\temp\payload.exe /sc once /st 23:59
  • at now + 1 minute /interactive "cmd.exe"

 

Identification of Obfuscation and Dynamic Constructs:
Scan for base64-encoded, concatenated, or dynamically constructed commands that attempt to evade static detection of time or scheduling logic.
Examples:

  • eval(base64.b64decode(payload))
  • task_command = "schtasks" + " /create /sc daily"
  • exec("sleep " + str(delay_seconds))

 

CI/CD Blocking and Exception Escalation:
Treat the above patterns as rule violations within CI/CD pipelines. Enforce blocking behavior unless a security-reviewed exception is filed. Ensure exception cases are logged, tagged, and auditable.

 

Pre-Deployment Artifact Scanning:
Apply static analysis not only to source code but to bundled artifacts such as container images, compiled scripts, or deployment templates (e.g., Terraform, CloudFormation) to catch embedded logic in infrastructure as code (IaC).

 

Cross-Team Code Review and Signature Expansion:
Maintain shared detection signatures across DevSecOps, application security, and insider risk teams. Regularly review triggered matches to refine accuracy and discover new anti-forensic variants.

 

Attestation of Safe Logic by Departing Engineers:
Require final code audits for subjects flagged for departure or termination. Mandate re-review of any automation, CI/CD jobs, or privileged scripting authored by the subject.

Sections

ID Name Description
AF025Delayed Execution Triggers

Subjects may embed deferred execution logic into scripts, binaries, or automation systems to evade real-time scrutiny and frustrate future investigation. These anti-forensic techniques decouple the triggering event from the subject’s active presence in the environment—delaying execution until the subject has departed or organizational oversight has waned.

 

Common methods include:

 

  • Time-Based Logic: Conditional execution paths that activate only after a predefined system date or time threshold (e.g., if (date > X)).
  • Extended Sleep or Delay Functions: Use of long-duration sleep, timeout, or delay calls to stall execution for hours or days.
  • Abuse of Scheduled Task Frameworks: Planting jobs in cron, Windows Task Scheduler, or enterprise orchestration systems with future execution dates, often disguised through misleading naming or non-obvious triggers.

 

These deferred actions are designed to blend into the environment and avoid correlation with the subject's session, user ID, or system interaction timeline. They may be used to execute sabotage, establish persistence, or exfiltrate data long after departure—frustrating incident response efforts and increasing dwell time before detection.