Infringement
Disruption of Business Operations
Excessive Personal Use
Exfiltration via Email
Exfiltration via Media Capture
Exfiltration via Messaging Applications
Exfiltration via Other Network Medium
Exfiltration via Physical Medium
- Exfiltration via Bring Your Own Device (BYOD)
- Exfiltration via Disk Media
- Exfiltration via Floppy Disk
- Exfiltration via New Internal Drive
- Exfiltration via Physical Access to System Drive
- Exfiltration via Physical Documents
- Exfiltration via Target Disk Mode
- Exfiltration via USB Mass Storage Device
- Exfiltration via USB to Mobile Device
- Exfiltration via USB to USB Data Transfer
Exfiltration via Web Service
Harassment and Discrimination
Inappropriate Web Browsing
Installing Unapproved Software
Misappropriation of Funds
Non-Corporate Device
Providing Access to a Unauthorized Third Party
Public Statements Resulting in Brand Damage
Sharing on AI Chatbot Platforms
Theft
Unauthorized Changes to IT Systems
Unauthorized Printing of Documents
Unauthorized VPN Client
Unlawfully Accessing Copyrighted Material
- ID: IF002
- Created: 31st May 2024
- Updated: 25th July 2024
- Contributor: The ITM Team
Exfiltration via Physical Medium
A subject may exfiltrate data via a physical medium, such as a removable drive.
Subsections
ID | Name | Description |
---|---|---|
IF002.010 | Exfiltration via Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) | A subject connects their personal device, under a Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) policy, to organization resources, such as on-premises systems or cloud-based platforms. By leveraging this access, the subject exfiltrates sensitive or confidential data. This unauthorized data transfer can occur through various means, including copying files to the personal device, sending data via email, or using cloud storage services. |
IF002.009 | Exfiltration via Disk Media | A subject exfiltrates data using writeable disk media. |
IF002.004 | Exfiltration via Floppy Disk | A subject exfiltrates data using a floppy disk drive. |
IF002.003 | Exfiltration via New Internal Drive | A subject exfiltrates data by connecting an additional drive to a system using the Serial Advanced Technology Attachment (SATA) interface on a motherboard, and copying files to the new storage device. |
IF002.002 | Exfiltration via Physical Access to System Drive | A subject exfiltrates data by retrieving the physical drive used by a system. |
IF002.005 | Exfiltration via Physical Documents | A subject tansports physical documents outside of the control of the organization. |
IF002.007 | Exfiltration via Target Disk Mode | When a Mac is booted into Target Disk Mode (by powering the computer on whilst holding the ‘T’ key), it acts as an external storage device, accessible from another computer via Thunderbolt, USB, or FireWire connections. A subject with physical access to the computer, and the ability to control boot options, can copy any data present on the target disk, bypassing the need to authenticate to the target computer. |
IF002.001 | Exfiltration via USB Mass Storage Device | A subject exfiltrates data using a USB-connected mass storage device, such as a USB flash drive or USB external hard-drive. |
IF002.008 | Exfiltration via USB to Mobile Device | The subject uses a USB cable, and any relevant software if required, to transfer files or data from one system to a mobile device. This device is then taken outside of the organization's control, where the subject can later access the contents. |
IF002.006 | Exfiltration via USB to USB Data Transfer | A USB to USB data transfer cable is a device designed to connect two computers directly together for the purpose of transferring files between them. These cables are equipped with a small electronic circuit to facilitate data transfer without the need for an intermediate storage device. Typically a USB to USB data transfer cable will require specific software to be installed to facilitate the data transfer. In the context of an insider threat, a USB to USB data transfer cable can be a tool for exfiltrating sensitive data from an organization's environment. |
Prevention
ID | Name | Description |
---|---|---|
PV016 | Enforce a Data Classification Policy | A Data Classification Policy establishes a standard for handling data by setting out criteria for how data should be classified and subsequently managed and secured. A classification can be applied to data in such a way that the classification is recorded in the body of the data (such as a footer in a text document) and/or within the metadata of a file. |
PV003 | Enforce an Acceptable Use Policy | An Acceptable Use Policy (AUP) is a set of rules outlining acceptable and unacceptable uses of an organization's computer systems and network resources. It acts as a deterrent to prevent employees from conducting illegitimate activities by clearly defining expectations, reinforcing legal and ethical standards, establishing accountability, specifying consequences for violations, and promoting education and awareness about security risks. |
Detection
ID | Name | Description |
---|---|---|
DT033 | Closed-Circuit Television | CCTV can be used to observe activity within or around a site. This control can help to detect preparation or infringement activities and record it to a video file. |
DT020 | Shellbags, USB Removable Storage | Shellbags are a set of Windows registry keys that contain details about a user-viewed folder, such as its size, position, thumbnail, and timestamps. Typically Shellbag information is created for folders that have been opened and closed with Windows File Explorer and default settings adjusted. However, Shellbag information can be created under various situations across different versions of Windows.
Windows 7 and later
Shellbags can disclose information about USB removable storage drives that are connected to the system, disclosing the drive letter and any files that were accessed from the drive. |
DT087 | USB MountPoints2 | MountPoints2 is a Windows Registry key used to store information about previously connected removable devices, such as USB drives, CDs, and other external storage media. It is located at:
Each subkey under MountPoints2 represents a unique device, often identified by its GUID (Globally Unique Identifier) or other unique identifier. |