Anti-Forensics
Clear Browser Artifacts
Clear Command History
Clear Operating System Logs
Decrease Privileges
Delete User Account
Deletion of Volume Shadow Copy
Disk Wiping
File Deletion
File Encryption
Hide Artifacts
Log Tampering
Modify Windows Registry
Physical Destruction of Storage Media
Physical Removal of Disk Storage
Steganography
System Shutdown
Timestomping
Tripwires
Uninstalling Software
Virtualization
Windows System Time Modification
- ID: AF022.002
- Created: 20th May 2025
- Updated: 20th May 2025
- Platform: Windows
- Contributor: Ryan Bellows
Use of Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL)
The subject leverages Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL) to contain forensic artifacts within a Linux-like runtime environment embedded in Windows. By operating inside WSL, the subject avoids writing sensitive data, tool activity, or command history to traditional Windows locations, significantly reducing visibility to host-based forensic and security tools.
WSL creates a logical Linux environment that appears separate from the Windows file system. Although some host-guest integration exists, activity within WSL often bypasses standard Windows event logging, registry updates, and process tracking. This allows the subject to execute scripts, use Unix-native tools, stage exfiltration, or decrypt payloads with minimal footprint on the host.
Example Scenarios:
- The subject downloads and processes sensitive files inside the WSL environment using native Linux tools (e.g.,
scp
,gpg
,rsync
), preventing access and modification timestamps from appearing in Windows Explorer or standard audit logs. - A subject extracts and stages exfiltration material in
/mnt/c
within WSL, using symbolic links and Linux file permissions to obscure its presence from Windows search and indexing services. - WSL is used to execute recon and credential-harvesting scripts (e.g.,
nmap
,hydra
,ssh
enumeration tools), with no execution trace in Windows Event Logs. - Upon completion of activity, the subject deletes the WSL distribution, leaving minimal residue on the host system—especially if no antivirus or EDR coverage extends into the WSL layer.
Prevention
ID | Name | Description |
---|---|---|
PV015 | Application Whitelisting | By only allowing pre-approved software to be installed and run on corporate devices, the subject is unable to install software themselves. |
PV020 | Data Loss Prevention Solution | A Data Loss Prevention (DLP) solution refers to policies, technologies, and controls that prevent the accidental and/or deliberate loss, misuse, or theft of data by members of an organization. Typically, DLP technology would take the form of a software agent installed on organization endpoints (such as laptops and servers).
Typical DLP technology will alert on the potential loss of data, or activity which might indicate the potential for data loss. A DLP technology may also provide automated responses to prevent data loss on a device. |
PV002 | Restrict Access to Administrative Privileges | The Principle of Least Privilege should be enforced, and period reviews of permissions conducted to ensure that accounts have the minimum level of access required to complete duties as per their role. |
PV057 | Structured Request Channels for Operational Needs | Establish and maintain formal, well-communicated pathways for personnel to request resources, report deficiencies, or propose operational improvements. By providing structured mechanisms to meet legitimate needs, organizations reduce the likelihood that subjects will bypass policy controls through opportunistic or unauthorized actions.
Implementation Approaches
Operational Principles
|
Detection
ID | Name | Description |
---|---|---|
DT123 | Access to /mnt/c/ from Within WSL | Monitor for file access operations originating from within the WSL environment targeting the mounted Windows file system at
Detection Methods: Enable command-line logging and process creation auditing for
Track I/O operations on the Windows file system via WSL bridge using tools capable of inspecting WSL file operations (e.g., enhanced Sysmon configs or custom sensors on
Indicators: |
DT046 | Agent Capable of Endpoint Detection and Response | An agent capable of Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) is a software agent installed on organization endpoints (such as laptops and servers) that (at a minimum) records the Operating System, application, and network activity on an endpoint.
Typically EDR operates in an agent/server model, where agents automatically send logs to a server, where the server correlates those logs based on a rule set. This rule set is then used to surface potential security-related events, that can then be analyzed.
An EDR agent typically also has some form of remote shell capability, where a user of the EDR platform can gain a remote shell session on a target endpoint, for incident response purposes. An EDR agent will typically have the ability to remotely isolate an endpoint, where all network activity is blocked on the target endpoint (other than the network activity required for the EDR platform to operate). |
DT045 | Agent Capable of User Activity Monitoring | An agent capable of User Activity Monitoring (UAM) is a software agent installed on organization endpoints (such as laptops); typically, User Activity Monitoring agents are only deployed on endpoints where a human user Is expected to conduct the activity.
The User Activity Monitoring agent will typically record Operating System, application, and network activity occurring on an endpoint, with a focus on activity that is or can be conducted by a human user. The purpose of this monitoring is to identify undesirable and/or malicious activity being conducted by a human user (in this context, an Insider Threat).
Typical User Activity Monitoring platforms operate in an agent/server model where activity logs are sent to a server for automatic correlation against a rule set. This rule set is used to surface activity that may represent Insider Threat related activity such as capturing screenshots, copying data, compressing files or installing risky software.
Other platforms providing related functionality are frequently referred to as User Behaviour Analytics (UBA) platforms. |
DT047 | Agent Capable of User Behaviour Analytics | An agent capable of User Behaviour Analytics (UBA) is a software agent installed on organizational endpoints (such as laptops). Typically, User Activity Monitoring agents are only deployed on endpoints where a human user is expected to conduct the activity.
The User Behaviour Analytics agent will typically record Operating System, application, and network activity occurring on an endpoint, focusing on activity that is or can be conducted by a human user. Typically, User Behaviour Analytics platforms operate in an agent/server model where activity logs are sent to a server for automatic analysis. In the case of User Behaviour Analytics, this analysis will typically be conducted against a baseline that has previously been established.
A User Behaviour Analytic platform will typically conduct a period of ‘baselining’ when the platform is first installed. This baselining period establishes the normal behavior parameters for an organization’s users, which are used to train a Machine Learning (ML) model. This ML model can then be later used to automatically identify activity that is predicted to be an anomaly, which is hoped to surface user behavior that is undesirable, risky, or malicious.
Other platforms providing related functionality are frequently referred to as User Activity Monitoring (UAM) platforms. |
DT124 | Installation of New WSL Distributions | Monitor for the registration or installation of new WSL distributions on Windows systems. This may indicate preparation for anti-forensics staging, tool isolation, or evasion of host-based controls by enabling a new, hidden runtime environment.
Detection Methods:
Log and alert on new subdirectory creation under
Indicators: |
DT043 | Sysmon Process Create Event | This detection is not enabled by default and requires additional configuration. System Monitor (Sysmon) Event ID 1 is used to record process execution. Reviewing these logs can determine what software has been run on a system. |
DT102 | User and Entity Behavior Analytics (UEBA) | Deploy User and Entity Behavior Analytics (UEBA) solutions designed for cloud environments to monitor and analyze the behavior of users, applications, network devices, servers, and other non-human resources. UEBA systems track normal behavior patterns and detect anomalies that could indicate potential insider events. For instance, they can identify when a user or entity is downloading unusually large volumes of data, accessing an excessive number of resources, or engaging in data transfers that deviate from their usual behavior. |
DT101 | User Behavior Analytics (UBA) | Implement User Behavior Analytics (UBA) tools to continuously monitor and analyze user (human) activities, detecting anomalies that may signal security risks. UBA can track and flag unusual behavior, such as excessive data downloads, accessing a higher-than-usual number of resources, or large-scale transfers inconsistent with a user’s typical patterns. UBA can also provide real-time alerts when users engage in behavior that deviates from established baselines, such as accessing sensitive data during off-hours or from unfamiliar locations. By identifying such anomalies, UBA enhances the detection of insider events. |