Preparation
Archive Data
Boot Order Manipulation
CCTV Enumeration
Circumventing Security Controls
Data Obfuscation
Data Staging
Device Mounting
Email Collection
External Media Formatting
File Download
File Exploration
Increase Privileges
IT Ticketing System Exploration
Network Scanning
Physical Disk Removal
Physical Exploration
Physical Item Smuggling
Private / Incognito Browsing
Read Windows Registry
Security Software Enumeration
Social Engineering (Outbound)
Software Installation
- Installing Browser Extensions
- Installing Browsers
- Installing Cloud Storage Applications
- Installing FTP Clients
- Installing Messenger Applications
- Installing Note-Taking Applications
- Installing RDP Clients
- Installing Screen Sharing Software
- Installing SSH Clients
- Installing Virtual Machines
- Installing VPN Applications
Software or Access Request
Suspicious Web Browsing
Testing Ability to Print
- ID: PR024.001
- Created: 25th April 2025
- Updated: 25th April 2025
- Platforms: MacOS, Linux, Windows,
- Contributor: The ITM Team
Privilege Escalation through Kerberoasting
Kerberoasting is a technique that can be exploited by a subject to escalate privileges and gain unauthorized access to sensitive systems within a network. From the perspective of a subject—who may be a low-privileged user with legitimate access to the network—the attack takes advantage of weaknesses in the Kerberos authentication protocol used by Active Directory (AD).
Kerberos Authentication Process
In a Kerberos-based network (like those using Active Directory), clients—users, computers, or services—authenticate to services using service tickets. When a client wants to access a service (e.g., a file server or email service), it requests a service ticket from the Ticket Granting Service (TGS). This request is made using the Service Principal Name (SPN) of the target service.
The TGS then issues a service ticket containing the hashed credentials (password) of the service account associated with that SPN. These credentials are encrypted in the service ticket, and the client can present the ticket to the service to authenticate.
Subject Requesting Service Tickets
A subject, typically a domain user with limited privileges, can exploit this process by requesting service tickets for service accounts running critical or high-privilege services, such as domain controllers or admin-level service accounts. These accounts are often associated with SPNs in Active Directory.
The subject can identify these SPNs—often for high-value targets like SQL Server, Exchange, or other administrative services—by querying the domain or using enumeration tools. Once these SPNs are identified, the subject can request service tickets for these service accounts from the TGS.
Cracking the Service Tickets
The key aspect of the Kerberoasting attack is that the service tickets contain hashed credentials of the service account. If these service accounts use weak, easily guessable passwords, the subject can extract the service tickets and attempt to crack the hashes offline using tools like Hashcat or John the Ripper.
Since these passwords are typically not subject to regular user password policies (i.e., they may not be as complex), weak or easily cracked passwords are a prime target for the subject.
Privilege Escalation and Unauthorized Access
Once the subject successfully cracks the password of a service account, they can use the credentials to gain elevated privileges. For example:
- If the cracked service account belongs to a high-privilege service (e.g., Domain Admins or Enterprise Admins), the subject can use these credentials to access systems, services, and parts of the network they would not ordinarily be permitted to access. This could include sensitive files, servers, or even Active Directory itself.
- The subject can use these credentials to move laterally within the network, expanding their access to additional systems that are typically restricted to high-privilege accounts.
- With administrative-level access, the subject can make changes to critical systems, alter configurations, or install malicious software. This could lead to further insider events, such as data exfiltration, malware deployment, or even persistent backdoors for ongoing unauthorized access.
Reconnaissance and Exploitation
The subject can perform additional reconnaissance within the network to identify other high-privilege accounts and services associated with service accounts. They can continue requesting service tickets for additional SPNs and cracking any other weak passwords they find, gradually escalating their access to more critical systems.
With broad access, the subject may also attempt to manipulate access controls, elevate privileges further, or carry out malicious actions undetected. This provides a potential stepping stone to more serious insider threats and an expanded attack surface for other actors.
Prevention
ID | Name | Description |
---|---|---|
PV023 | Access Reviews | Routine reviews of user accounts and their associated privileges and permissions should be conducted to identify overly-permissive accounts, or accounts that are no longer required to be active. |
PV015 | Application Whitelisting | By only allowing pre-approved software to be installed and run on corporate devices, the subject is unable to install software themselves. |
PV003 | Enforce an Acceptable Use Policy | An Acceptable Use Policy (AUP) is a set of rules outlining acceptable and unacceptable uses of an organization's computer systems and network resources. It acts as a deterrent to prevent employees from conducting illegitimate activities by clearly defining expectations, reinforcing legal and ethical standards, establishing accountability, specifying consequences for violations, and promoting education and awareness about security risks. |
PV048 | Privileged Access Management (PAM) | Privileged Access Management (PAM) is a critical security practice designed to control and monitor access to sensitive systems and data. By managing and securing accounts with elevated privileges, PAM helps reduce the risk of insider threats and unauthorized access to critical infrastructure.
Key Prevention Measures:
Benefits:
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Detection
ID | Name | Description |
---|---|---|
DT046 | Agent Capable of Endpoint Detection and Response | An agent capable of Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) is a software agent installed on organization endpoints (such as laptops and servers) that (at a minimum) records the Operating System, application, and network activity on an endpoint.
Typically EDR operates in an agent/server model, where agents automatically send logs to a server, where the server correlates those logs based on a rule set. This rule set is then used to surface potential security-related events, that can then be analyzed.
An EDR agent typically also has some form of remote shell capability, where a user of the EDR platform can gain a remote shell session on a target endpoint, for incident response purposes. An EDR agent will typically have the ability to remotely isolate an endpoint, where all network activity is blocked on the target endpoint (other than the network activity required for the EDR platform to operate). |
DT045 | Agent Capable of User Activity Monitoring | An agent capable of User Activity Monitoring (UAM) is a software agent installed on organization endpoints (such as laptops); typically, User Activity Monitoring agents are only deployed on endpoints where a human user Is expected to conduct the activity.
The User Activity Monitoring agent will typically record Operating System, application, and network activity occurring on an endpoint, with a focus on activity that is or can be conducted by a human user. The purpose of this monitoring is to identify undesirable and/or malicious activity being conducted by a human user (in this context, an Insider Threat).
Typical User Activity Monitoring platforms operate in an agent/server model where activity logs are sent to a server for automatic correlation against a rule set. This rule set is used to surface activity that may represent Insider Threat related activity such as capturing screenshots, copying data, compressing files or installing risky software.
Other platforms providing related functionality are frequently referred to as User Behaviour Analytics (UBA) platforms. |
DT047 | Agent Capable of User Behaviour Analytics | An agent capable of User Behaviour Analytics (UBA) is a software agent installed on organizational endpoints (such as laptops). Typically, User Activity Monitoring agents are only deployed on endpoints where a human user is expected to conduct the activity.
The User Behaviour Analytics agent will typically record Operating System, application, and network activity occurring on an endpoint, focusing on activity that is or can be conducted by a human user. Typically, User Behaviour Analytics platforms operate in an agent/server model where activity logs are sent to a server for automatic analysis. In the case of User Behaviour Analytics, this analysis will typically be conducted against a baseline that has previously been established.
A User Behaviour Analytic platform will typically conduct a period of ‘baselining’ when the platform is first installed. This baselining period establishes the normal behavior parameters for an organization’s users, which are used to train a Machine Learning (ML) model. This ML model can then be later used to automatically identify activity that is predicted to be an anomaly, which is hoped to surface user behavior that is undesirable, risky, or malicious.
Other platforms providing related functionality are frequently referred to as User Activity Monitoring (UAM) platforms. |
DT111 | Cyber Deception, Honey SPN | Service Principal Names (SPNs) are unique identifiers used by the Kerberos authentication protocol to associate a service instance with a specific account in Active Directory. In the Kerberos authentication process, a client—which could be any user, computer, or service—requests access to a particular service, such as email, file shares, or database servers. To authenticate and gain access to that service, the client must obtain a service ticket from the Ticket Granting Service (TGS).
The client first requests a Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) from the Key Distribution Center (KDC), which is part of the Kerberos infrastructure. Once the client has a TGT, it can use it to request a service ticket from the TGS for a specific service identified by its SPN. The service ticket contains the hashed credentials of the service account associated with that SPN, allowing the client to authenticate to the service securely. In a Kerberoasting attack, an adversary—who is often a domain-joined user—requests service tickets for service accounts with weak or guessable passwords. These tickets can then be captured and cracked offline to reveal the service account’s password. This process is typically initiated by an attacker who targets SPNs associated with high-privilege accounts.
A Honey SPN is a decoy SPN created with no legitimate use, designed specifically to attract malicious actors. By monitoring for TGS requests for these fake SPNs, defenders can detect when attackers are probing for service tickets associated with non-existent or intentionally misleading accounts. These unauthorized requests serve as an early detection mechanism, allowing defenders to identify enumeration attempts and potential attack activities before credential abuse occurs.
Event ID: 4769 – Kerberos Service Ticket Request (Security Log) |
DT102 | User and Entity Behavior Analytics (UEBA) | Deploy User and Entity Behavior Analytics (UEBA) solutions designed for cloud environments to monitor and analyze the behavior of users, applications, network devices, servers, and other non-human resources. UEBA systems track normal behavior patterns and detect anomalies that could indicate potential insider events. For instance, they can identify when a user or entity is downloading unusually large volumes of data, accessing an excessive number of resources, or engaging in data transfers that deviate from their usual behavior. |