Prompt and build artifact integrity verification confirms that the synthetic subject is running from approved artifacts and approved operating instructions. The detection compares deployed prompts, extension bundles, compiled outputs, configuration packages, and shipped artifacts against signed baselines so that prompt drift, injected instructions, or altered build outputs are surfaced as integrity failures.

Implementation

Maintain signed, approved reference versions for the synthetic subject’s system prompt, developer instructions, policy files, tool configuration, Model Context Protocol (MCP) configuration, extension bundles, compiled outputs, container images, release packages, and build manifests. Without a known-good reference, the detection cannot reliably identify divergence.

At the build and distribution boundary, verify shipped artifacts against signed source, build manifests, Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) records, dependency lockfiles, artifact hashes, and release attestations. Alert when the production artifact, extension bundle, compiled output, or release package does not match the approved build output, contains unapproved prompt material, or differs from the signed source used during review.

At runtime, hash the effective system prompt and operating instruction stack actually provided to the synthetic subject. Compare the runtime hash against the approved baseline for that subject, model version, deployment, and environment. Alert when the effective prompt, prompt order, policy block, developer instruction, tool-use rule, or configuration package differs from the approved reference without an authorized change record.

Perform both checks because they cover different failure points. Build verification detects artifact tampering before or during shipping. Runtime prompt verification detects post-deployment instruction drift, environment-specific overrides, unauthorized prompt edits, and configuration changes that occur after an otherwise clean artifact is deployed.

Investigative Use

This detection supports investigation of model and build provenance failures, standing instruction stack drift, poisoned artifacts, embedded prompt injection, unauthorized configuration change, and misaligned directive. It helps investigators determine whether the synthetic subject acted under the approved prompt and build artifact, or under a modified instruction or artifact surface.

It is especially useful where a shipped artifact appears legitimate but the runtime prompt has changed, where the runtime prompt matches the baseline but the delivered artifact differs from the signed build, or where injected instructions enter between authoring, build, deployment, and execution.

Sections